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- Title
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITH RANDOM RESERVATION UTILITY LEVEL.
- Authors
MARINESCU, Daniela Elena; MARIN, Dumitru
- Abstract
The article focuses on a study related to the problem associated with the incentive theory of a bilateral contracting framework. As per the study, an adverse selection model where the agent's private information is represented by marginal cost of production was considered for the study. The study further mentions that depending on outside utility level agent's participation is taken as deterministic.
- Subjects
INFORMATION asymmetry; CONTRACTS; LABOR incentives; INDUSTRIAL costs; MARGINAL utility
- Publication
Economic Computation & Economic Cybernetics Studies & Research, 2012, Vol 46, Issue 3, p25
- ISSN
0424-267X
- Publication type
Article