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- Title
EXCESS-ENTRY THEOREM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LICENSING.
- Authors
MUKHERJEE, ARIJIT; MUKHERJEE, SOMA
- Abstract
We show that, in the presence of technology licensing, entry in an industry with Cournot competition may lead to a socially insufficient, number of firms. Insufficient entry occurs if the own marginal cost of the entrant is sufficiently high. Hence, the justification for anticompetitive entry regulation due to the standard excess-entry result may not be justified in the presence of licensing. However, if the own marginal cost of the entrant is very low, licensing may create excessive entry for those entry costs where entry does not occur without licensing; thus licensing reduces social welfare though it increases competition.
- Subjects
TECHNOLOGY; MERCHANDISE licensing; LICENSE agreements; ECONOMIC competition; INDUSTRIAL concentration; COMPETITOR orientation; COMMERCE; SOCIAL services; PUBLIC welfare
- Publication
Manchester School (1463-6786), 2008, Vol 76, Issue 6, p675
- ISSN
1463-6786
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2008.01088.x