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- Title
特许经营项目合同再谈判阶段参与方 决策行为博弈分析.
- Authors
李倍安; 王俊杰; 陈 琳; 何寿奎; 李沅睿
- Abstract
In order to analyze the opportunistic behavior of social capital in the contract renegotiation stage of early termination of franchise projects, an evolutionary game model of government, social capital and the public is established from two aspects: relationship termination and entity termination of contract renegotiation. It is found that the punishment of government on opportunistic behavior and social capital's perception of the benefits of opportunistic behavior are the key factors affecting the choice of opportunistic behavior of social capital. It is proposed that encouraging the public to participate in the operation supervision in the contract negotiation stage of franchise projects, upgrading the government supervision mode, and reducing the supervision cost and information acquisition cost of all parties are important guarantees for establishing the linkage governance mechanism of government-led and public participation. The research results provide policy basis for establishing the linkage governance mechanism between the government and the public.
- Subjects
DISCHARGE of contracts; SOCIAL capital; PUNISHMENT (Psychology); CONTRACT negotiations; SOCIAL contract; RISK perception
- Publication
Journal of Engineering Management / Gongcheng Guanli Xuebao, 2023, Vol 37, Issue 3, p059
- ISSN
1674-8859
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.13991/j.cnki.jem.2023.03.011