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- Title
The Normativity Objection to Normative Reduction.
- Authors
Fleming, Patrick
- Abstract
Non-naturalists claim that the nature of normativity precludes the possibility of normative naturalism. In particular, they think that normative reduction amounts to normative elimination. This is because it always leaves out the normative. In this paper, I examine the force that the normativity objection has against Humean reductionism. I argue that the normativity objection has no argumentative force against reductionism. When it is presented as a bare intuition, it begs the question against reduction. A more interesting reading of the argument claims that the normative cannot be explained in terms of the natural because the natural is arbitrary. Yet, this version of the argument fails as well because the natural is not arbitrary in the relevant sense. The natural is contingent, so what has value is contingent. That is not an elimination of the normative though, because contingent reasons are still reasons.
- Subjects
NORMATIVITY (Ethics); NATURALISTS; REDUCTIONISM; PROBLEM solving; DATA analysis
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2015, Vol 30, Issue 4, p419
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-015-0255-y