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- Title
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AS A PRISONER'S DILEMMA.
- Authors
STEINITZ, MAYA; GOWDER, PAUL
- Abstract
In this Article we use game theory to argue that perceptions of widespread corruption in the judicial processes in developing countries create ex ante incentives to act corruptly. It is rational (though not moral) to preemptively act corruptly when litigating in the courts of many nations. The upshot of this analysis is to highlight that, contrary to judicial narratives in individual cases--such as the (in)famous Chevron-Ecuador dispute used herein as an illustration--the problem of corruption in transnational litigation is structural and thus calls for structural solutions. The Article offers one such solution: the establishment of an international court of civil justice.
- Subjects
INTERNATIONAL litigation; INTERNATIONAL Court of Justice; CORRUPTION; TRIAL courts; FOREIGN investments
- Publication
North Carolina Law Review, 2016, Vol 94, Issue 3, p751
- ISSN
0029-2524
- Publication type
Article