We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Knowledge of Moral Incapacity.
- Authors
Cox, Ryan
- Abstract
Williams begins this task by noting that "[a] moral incapacity belongs to the species: incapacity to do a certain thing knowingly."[48] According to Williams, this distinguishes moral incapacities from physical incapacities and many psychological incapacities. Williams himself takes the task of giving a theory of moral incapacities to be that of distinguishing moral incapacities from other kinds of incapacities, including physical incapacities and other psychological incapacities. My topic in this essay is what Bernard Williams calls "moral incapacity."[1] I propose to approach this topic by means of a closely related topic, namely, I knowledge i of moral incapacity. It is here that I think we can do better than Williams and offer a more fine-grained theory of moral incapacity, one which solves the puzzle about knowledge of moral incapacities, and which relates moral incapacities to deliberation in the way that Williams wants to.
- Subjects
GOSSIP; PRACTICAL reason; ETHICS; THEORY of knowledge; THEORY of self-knowledge; MORAL reasoning; RATIONAL-legal authority; MORAL development
- Publication
Journal of Value Inquiry, 2023, Vol 57, Issue 2, p385
- ISSN
0022-5363
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10790-021-09832-y