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- Title
Political Deadlock in German Financial Market Policy.
- Authors
Handke, Stefan
- Abstract
The financial crisis revealed weaknesses of the global financial market regulation and of most national supervisory systems. This is also true for Germany, where institutional reforms, this is the reconfiguration of regulation and supervision, have been politically discussed in the aftermath of the crisis. The debate on the German authority BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) and the quarrel between BaFin, the Bundesbank and political actors is the main topic of this article. It emphasizes that utility maximizing strategies of actors led to a kind of political deadlock which prevented policy learning and institutional change. Industrial lobby organizations, political parties and executive bodies had different interests concerning the institutional design of supervisory structures. Due to the veto power of some actors there have been hardly any institutional changes or improvements of supervision in Germany after the crisis.
- Subjects
GERMANY; GERMANY. Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht; FINANCIAL markets -- Government policy; FINANCIAL crises; ADMINISTRATIVE reform; POLITICAL parties; GERMAN politics &; government; TWENTY-first century
- Publication
German Policy Studies/Politikfeldanalyse, 2012, Vol 8, Issue 1, p43
- ISSN
1523-9764
- Publication type
Article