We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Transparency and incentives among peers.
- Authors
Winter, Eyal
- Abstract
This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives.
- Subjects
LABOR incentives; COST; ORGANIZATIONAL transparency; DISCLOSURE; DIRECTED graphs; TEAMS in the workplace
- Publication
RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell), 2010, Vol 41, Issue 3, p504
- ISSN
0741-6261
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00109.x