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- Title
PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ONTOLOGY OF STATUTES.
- Authors
Walt, Steven
- Abstract
This article focuses on practical reason accounts of statutory interpretation. There are obvious and important differences between the content of the assertions: one is a descriptive claim about the world; the other is a claim about the meaning of a legislative enactment. But the requirement of epistemic warrant is present in both instances. The Law Lords in Pepper versus Hart case limited the operation of the no Hansard rule: the rule that parliamentary material is inadmissible to prove the meaning of a piece of legislation. Limitations on the admissibility of legislative history state requirements of evidence: the grounds upon which assertions about the meaning of legislative enactments are justified. Interpreters of statutes, according to practical reason accounts, are to consider the text, legislative history, legislative purpose and intention, the evolution of the statute and current values. No standard is provided for excluding one or both of the interpretations as being supported by the evidence. Conditions for the existence of the object of interpretation are required. The best justification of an object of interpretation at least in part depends on the nature of that object.
- Subjects
LAW; WARRANTS (Law); LEGISLATIVE histories; STATUTES
- Publication
Law & Philosophy, 1996, Vol 15, Issue 3, p227
- ISSN
0167-5249
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF00161335