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- Title
Performance, Promotion and Information.
- Authors
Jaroslav, Zajac
- Abstract
If a firm provides incentives by promoting those who have performed well in a job, it may transfer them to a job to which they are not well suited and agents are promoted to their levels of incompetence. Tournaments are an alternative to reputation as a means of ensuring that firms reward good performance when performance is unverifiable.
- Subjects
LABOR incentives; JOB performance; EMPLOYEE reviews; PERFORMANCE management; EMPLOYEE promotions; RISK management in business; PARETO optimum; SPAN of control; PERSONNEL management; LABOR supply; EMPLOYEE bonuses; MANAGEMENT
- Publication
Journal of Business Ethics, 2004, Vol 50, Issue 2, p187
- ISSN
0167-4544
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1023/B:BUSI.0000022124.95071.0c