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- Title
Strategic Managerial Incentives and Cross Ownership Structure: A Note.
- Authors
Macho-Stadler, Inés; Verdier, Thierry
- Abstract
In this note, we study the behavior of firms competing in a Cournot duopoly framework where owners and managers are separate identities and where cross-participation at the ownership level exists. We find that depending on the degree of cross ownership, managerial incentives may be more or less towards profit maximizing behavior. Moreover we show that limited cross-participation may he a way for owners to obtain "collusive behavior" without apparently offending "Anti-Trust" laws.
- Subjects
CORPORATE profits; PROFIT maximization; INDUSTRIAL management; BUSINESS logistics; INDUSTRIAL procurement
- Publication
Journal of Economics, 1991, Vol 53, Issue 3, p285
- ISSN
0931-8658
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF01227626