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- Title
K ⊈ E.
- Authors
Zardini, Elia
- Abstract
In a series of very influential works, Tim Williamson has advanced and defended a much discussed theory of evidence containing, among other claims, the thesis that, if one knows P, P is part of one's evidence ( K ⊆ E). I argue that K ⊆ E is false, and indeed that it is so for a reason that Williamson himself essentially provides in arguing against the thesis that, if one has a justified true belief in P, P is part of one's evidence: together with a very plausible principle governing the acquisition of knowledge by non-deductive inference based on evidence, K ⊆ E leads, in a sorites-like fashion, to what would seem a series of unacceptably bootstrapping expansions of one's evidence. I then develop some considerations about the functions of and conditions for evidence which are suggested by the argument against K ⊆ E. I close by discussing the relationship of the argument with anti-closure arguments of the style exemplified by the preface paradox: I contend that, if closure is assumed, it is extremely plausible to expect that the diagnosis of what goes wrong in the preface-paradox-style argument cannot be used to block my own argument.
- Subjects
WILLIAMSON, Timothy, 1955-; JUSTIFICATION (Theory of knowledge); INTERPERSONAL conflict; STATISTICAL bootstrapping; PHILOSOPHICAL research
- Publication
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 2017, Vol 94, Issue 3, p540
- ISSN
0031-8205
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phpr.12365