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- Title
Arbitration in classical Athens.
- Authors
McCannon, Bryan C.
- Abstract
The Classical Athenians developed two formal arbitration procedures. They assigned low stakes disputes to a panel of arbitrators, while high stakes cases were handled by a single arbitrator. Given the information aggregation benefit of collective decision making, one would have expected more individuals to be assigned to more important cases. I develop a theoretical model to provide an explanation for their design. Recognizing that arbitrator competence is endogenous, effort put into making a good decision takes time and effort. In larger groups free riding is a concern. Consequently, there exists environments where the free-riding loss is magnified in higher stakes disputes to the point where the socially optimal panel size is inversely related to the stakes involved.
- Subjects
DISPUTE resolution; GROUP size; CITIZENS; JURY; DEMOCRACY
- Publication
Constitutional Political Economy, 2018, Vol 29, Issue 4, p413
- ISSN
1043-4062
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10602-018-9267-0