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- Title
Self-Funding and Agency Independence.
- Authors
Kruly, Charles
- Abstract
Self-funded agencies are a rarity in administrative law. Their freedom from both congressional budgetary approval and the congressional appropriations process, however, gives self-funded agencies a unique degree of political independence. Working from the premise that self-funded agencies are free from any meaningful congressional control, this Essay examines whether and how self-funded agencies are also removed from direct Executive oversight. The answer is not simple; just as there is no off-the-shelf design for an administrative agency, so too does every self-funded agency have a unique structure. Nevertheless, this Essay finds that, as a group, self-funded agencies are independent of direct Executive control in a number of important ways, leading to the conclusion that self-funded agencies are likely the most structurally--if not necessarily politically--independent agencies in the federal government
- Subjects
UNITED States; FINANCING of government agencies; ADMINISTRATIVE law; PUBLIC spending; UNITED States. Congress; EXECUTIVE oversight; DODD-Frank Wall Street Reform &; Consumer Protection Act; UNITED States. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
- Publication
George Washington Law Review, 2013, Vol 81, Issue 5, p1733
- ISSN
0016-8076
- Publication type
Essay