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- Title
INFORMATION AND ENDOGENOUS DELEGATION IN A RENT-SEEKING CONTEST.
- Authors
Schoonbeek, Lambert
- Abstract
We offer a new explanation for the occurrence of delegation in rent-seeking contests. We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common value. The players only know that the prize is high or low, with given probabilities. Each player can hire a delegate to act on his behalf. After a delegate is hired, she privately observes the true value of the prize. We derive the conditions under which, respectively, no player, only one player, or both players delegate in equilibrium. ( JEL D7)
- Subjects
ENDOGENOUS growth (Economics); RENT (Economic theory); FIRST-order logic; MONOPOLIES; LIMITED liability; RENT seeking; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2017, Vol 55, Issue 3, p1497
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ecin.12444