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- Title
A hobgoblin of large minds: Troubles with consistency in belief.
- Authors
Sommer, Joseph; Musolino, Julien; Hemmer, Pernille
- Abstract
Beliefs are, in many ways, central to psychology and, in turn, consistency is central to belief. Theories in philosophy and psychology assume that beliefs must be consistent with each other for people to be rational. That people fail to hold fully consistent beliefs has, therefore, been the subject of much theorizing, with numerous mechanisms proposed to explain how inconsistency is possible. Despite the widespread assumption of consistency as a default, achieving a consistent set of beliefs is computationally intractable. We review research on consistency in philosophy and psychology and argue that it is consistency, not inconsistency, that requires explanation. We discuss evidence from the attitude, belief, and persuasion literatures, which suggests that accessibility of beliefs in memory is one possible mechanism for achieving a limited, but psychologically plausible, form of consistency. Finally, we conclude by suggesting future directions for research beginning from the assumption of inconsistency as the default. This article is categorized under:Psychology > Reasoning and Decision MakingPsychology > Theory and MethodsPhilosophy > Knowledge and Belief
- Subjects
THEORY (Philosophy); PSYCHOLOGY; PERSUASION (Psychology); DEFAULT (Finance)
- Publication
WIREs: Cognitive Science, 2023, Vol 14, Issue 4, p1
- ISSN
1939-5078
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1002/wcs.1639