We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint.
- Authors
Jaramillo, Paula; Kayı, Çaǧatay; Klijn, Flip
- Abstract
We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
- Subjects
BUDGET; PROPERTY rights; COMPENSATION (Law); THIRD party reimbursement; WELFARE economics
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2014, Vol 43, Issue 3, p603
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8