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- Title
A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof.
- Authors
Akahoshi, Takashi
- Abstract
We study one-to-one matching problems and analyze conditions on preference domains that admit the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. In this context, when a preference domain is unrestricted, it is known that no stable rule is strategy-proof. We introduce the notion of the no-detour condition, and show that under this condition, there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule. In addition, we show that when the men's preference domain is unrestricted, the no-detour condition is also a necessary condition for the existence of stable and strategy-proof rules. As a result, under the assumption that the men's preference domain is unrestricted, the following three statements are equivalent: (i) a preference domain satisfies the no-detour condition, (ii) there is a stable and group strategy-proof rule, (iii) there is a stable and strategy-proof rule.
- Subjects
MARRIAGE theorem; EXISTENCE theorems; MATHEMATICAL domains; CHOICE (Psychology); FUNCTIONAL analysis
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2014, Vol 43, Issue 3, p683
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-014-0803-1