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- Title
A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games.
- Authors
Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe
- Abstract
We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al. in Theory Decis 79:251-283, 2015). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274-294, 2001), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rooted tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them. Our proofs rely on interesting properties that we provide for a general class of bidding mechanisms.
- Subjects
BIDDING strategies; COOPERATIVE game theory; GAME theory; BIDDERS; SOCIAL dominance
- Publication
Annals of Operations Research, 2017, Vol 253, Issue 1, p43
- ISSN
0254-5330
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5