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- Title
T OR 1-t. THAT IS THE TRADE-OFF.
- Authors
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S.
- Abstract
A social welfare function f is Arrovian if it has transitive values and satisfies Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. For any fraction t and any Arrovian social welfare function f, either there will be some individual who dictates on a subset containing at least the fraction t of outcomes, or at least the fraction 1 - t of the ordered pairs of outcomes have their social ranking fixed independently of individual preference. If individual preferences are strong, we can say more: Associated with any Arrovian social welfare function, there is a set containing a large fraction of citizens whose preferences are not consulted in determining the social ranking of a large fraction of the pairs of alternatives. (The Pareto criterion is not assumed.
- Subjects
CHARITIES; MULTIPLY transitive groups; MATHEMATICAL functions; PARETO optimum; ECONOMICS; ECONOMETRICS
- Publication
Econometrica, 1993, Vol 61, Issue 6, p1355
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/2951646