We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
In defence of fact-dependency.
- Authors
de Maagt, Sem
- Abstract
G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.
- Subjects
CONSTRUCTIVISM (Philosophy); PHILOSOPHY; PHILOSOPHY of science; FACTS (Philosophy); EXPERIENCE
- Publication
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2014, Vol 44, Issue 3/4, p443
- ISSN
0045-5091
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1080/00455091.2014.955268