We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games.
- Authors
Bloch, Francis; Diamantoudi, Effrosyni
- Abstract
We study a bargaining procedure of coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players' preferences depend solely on the coalition they belong to. We provide an example of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium, and a necessary and sufficient condition for existence. We show that when the game is totally stable (the game and all its restrictions have a nonempty core), there always exists a no-delay equilibrium generating core outcomes. Other equilibria exhibiting delay or resulting in unstable outcomes can also exist. If the core of the hedonic game and its restrictions always consist of a single point, we show that the bargaining game admits a unique stationary perfect equilibrium, resulting in the immediate formation of the core coalition structure.
- Subjects
NONCOOPERATIVE games (Mathematics); GAME theory; NEGOTIATION; SECRETARY problem (Probability theory); EXISTENCE theorems; EQUILIBRIUM; MARRIAGE theorem
- Publication
International Journal of Game Theory, 2011, Vol 40, Issue 2, p263
- ISSN
0020-7276
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00182-010-0237-7