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- Title
Pritchard, Revisionism and Warranted Assertability.
- Authors
Cockram, Nathan
- Abstract
Against contextualism, Duncan Pritchard has argued that conversational pragmatics give rise to an argument in favour of invariantist neo-Mooreanism. More specifically, he argues that when we conjoin a Moorean view with a warranted assertability manoeuvre, we can satisfy our pre-theoretical intuitions (which are decidedly invariantist), whereas contextualists cannot. In the following paper, I challenge Pritchard's argument and contend that he is too quick to declare victory for invariantism, for not only does the WAM he employs appear to be ad hoc vis-à-vis DeRose's plausible criteria, but it also seems to have very implausible pragmatic implications when subjected to close scrutiny.
- Subjects
PRITCHARD, Duncan; CONTEXTUALISM (Philosophy); PRAGMATICS; MOORE, G. E., 1873-1958; THEORY of knowledge
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2016, Vol 31, Issue 4, p439
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-016-0288-x