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- Title
Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform.
- Authors
Brower, Ann L.; Meguire, Philip; Monks, Adrian
- Abstract
This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees' desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from "bureaucratic coping," or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem.
- Subjects
NEW Zealand; LAND reform; AGENCY theory; NEGOTIATION; GOVERNMENT agencies; BUREAUCRACY
- Publication
Land Economics, 2010, Vol 86, Issue 3, p467
- ISSN
0023-7639
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3368/le.86.3.467