We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Takeover Protection and Firm Value.
- Authors
Andres, Christian; Jacob, Martin; Ulrich, Lennart
- Abstract
We examine firm value consequences of anti-takeover regulation, exploiting the staggered announcement and implementation of an anti-takeover regulation in the U.K. We show that, on average, takeover protection increases firm value. This effect is partly driven by innovative firms expanding their R&D activities. However, the anti-takeover regulation also increases the value of less productive firms. Anti-takeover regulation could thus constrain highly productive firms from taking over low-productivity firms. Our results imply that, while takeover protection may stimulate innovation, it can distort the allocation of funds by preventing market share from moving from less efficient to more efficient firms.
- Subjects
ANTITAKEOVER strategies; VALUATION of corporations; MERGERS &; acquisitions law; INDUSTRIAL productivity; ALLOCATION (Accounting); MARKET share
- Publication
Review of Law & Economics, 2019, Vol 15, Issue 1, pN.PAG
- ISSN
1555-5879
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1515/rle-2018-0048