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- Title
Filosofia da filosofia: podem as teses filosóficas ser 'crenças verdadeiras justificadas'?
- Authors
Oliva, Alberto
- Abstract
Starting from the epistemic requirements stated by the standard view of knowledge, according to which knowledge is 'justified true belief', this article aims to identify the reasons why substantive philosophical theories have failed to satisfy them. Accepted this view of knowledge, philosophy will hardly be able to assign cognitive status to its theories. This article also intends to show that philosophy has its cognitive credibility put in check when it constructs abstruse rhetorical exercises that speciously seek to legitimize themselves as knowledge. Besides forging philosophical theories deprived of cognitive value, philosophy creates theories composed by propositions clearly meaningless. In developing theories devoid of any cognitive potential and theories whose propositions lack meaning, philosophy is liable to have its cognitivity seriously questioned. However, the final assessment of philosophy cannot be confined to its cognitive dimension since its theories have the power of providing ways of seeing reality even when they fail in their attempts to explain objects.
- Subjects
PHILOSOPHY methodology; THEORY of knowledge; TRUTH; HISTORY of philosophy; PHILOSOPHY &; science; HYBRIS (The Greek word); HISTORY
- Publication
Veritas, 2014, Vol 59, Issue 1, p106
- ISSN
0042-3955
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.15448/1984-6746.2014.1.13539