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- Title
Supply chain coordination based on revenue-sharing contract with a loss-averse retailer and capital constraint.
- Authors
Wu, Chengfeng; Zhao, Qiuhong; Lin, Shuaicheng; Xu, Chunfeng
- Abstract
The paper aims to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We consider an uncooperative ordering model in a supplier-Stackelberg game and coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract for a loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer. We drive the existence and uniqueness conditions of the optimal solutions under bank financing and revenue-sharing contract. We also develop a series of propositions and corollaries to determine the optimal solutions and offer some managerial insights. The key contribution of the paper is to deepen and expand the revenue-sharing contract under the risk-neutral assumption, and to provide a theoretical basis for the application of revenue-sharing contract under bounded rationality and capital constraints. We find that the revenue-sharing ratio of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer and the expected utility of loss-averse and capital-constrained retailer is larger than that of neutral retailer under coordination strategy with revenue-sharing contract.
- Subjects
SUPPLY chains; BOUNDED rationality; EXPECTED utility; CONTRACTS; RETAIL industry
- Publication
Soft Computing - A Fusion of Foundations, Methodologies & Applications, 2024, Vol 28, Issue 4, p3015
- ISSN
1432-7643
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00500-023-09229-y