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- Title
The design of rent-seeking competitions.
- Authors
Michaels, Robert
- Abstract
In the standard Tullock model of rent-seeking as a noncooperative game, aggregate expenditures by seekers can equal, exceed, or fall short of total rents depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker's investment. If the supply of an input into the rent-seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it, the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious problem. He supplies it and designs the rent-seeking game to maximize his wealth. The author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician's wealth in one-input and two-input rent-seeking processes.
- Subjects
RENT subsidies; ECONOMIC competition; INVESTMENTS; POLITICIANS; POLITICAL community
- Publication
Public Choice, 1988, Vol 56, Issue 1, p17
- ISSN
0048-5829
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF00052067