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- Title
Negotiations before negotiations: China's alliance politics and the prelude to the Kaesong talks, 1950-1951.
- Authors
DENG Feng
- Abstract
After dispatching troops to Korea, China quickly defeated the United Nations forces, and moved the front line to the proximity of the 38th Parallel. The U.S. had to seek a truce. As a result, both sides launched an indirect dialogue through a third party. On January 11, 1951, the United Nations put forward a cease-fire proposal which included provisions to solve the Taiwan problem and China's representation at the UN, it was rejected by the Chinese Government. Zhou Enlai and other leaders from Foreign Ministry explained to several foreign envoys the reasons for China's rejection of the UN proposal: "cease-fire first, then negotiations". According to the declassified archives, in a conversation between Zhou Enlai and Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, Chinese decision makers gave serious consideration for accepting the UN proposal. However, the Soviet Union took a very hard line against a cease-fire in Korea. China needed strong assistance from the Soviet Union during the Korean War, and Moscow seized the opportunity to play a leading role in the Sino-Soviet alliance. During the Korean War, China had to give great weight to the opinions from Moscow. Eventually, the Chinese overcame Soviet objections and opened the formal armistice negotiations with the U.S. But by that point the changing situation on the battlefield meant that the issues of Taiwan and UN representation were no longer included in the proposal.
- Subjects
KAESONG-si (Korea); DIPLOMATIC negotiations in international disputes; UNITED Nations; ARMISTICES; AMBASSADORS; INTERNATIONAL alliances
- Publication
Journal of Sino-Western Communications, 2013, Vol 5, Issue 2, p13
- ISSN
2153-0114
- Publication type
Article