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- Title
DODD-FRANK: FRANKLY AN INEFFICIENT FORM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.
- Authors
Nemeroff, Matthew H.
- Abstract
The article discusses the U.S. Congress's regulation regarding financial crisis in the U.S. and reflects that the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Dodd-Frank) showcase an inefficient form of corporate governance. It analyzes two components of Dodd-Frank including the regulations imposed by it on derivative transactions and its say-on-pay provisions which requires public companies to obtain a nonbinding vote from their shareholders on executive compensation.
- Subjects
UNITED States; FINANCIAL crises; DODD-Frank Wall Street Reform &; Consumer Protection Act; UNITED States. Congress; CORPORATE governance; STOCKHOLDERS
- Publication
University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2012, Vol 23, Issue 3, p431
- ISSN
1047-8035
- Publication type
Article