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- Title
Reinstatement, floating conclusions, and the credulity of Mental Model reasoning
- Authors
Bonnefon, Jean-François
- Abstract
Johnson-Laird and coworkers’ Mental Model theory of propositional reasoning is shown to be somewhere in between what logicians have defined as “credulous” and “skeptical” with respect to the conclusions it draws on default reasoning problems. It is then argued that in situations where skeptical reasoning has been shown to lead to problematic conclusions due to not being skeptical enough, the bolder Mental Model theory will likewise make counterintuitive predictions. This claim is supported by the consideration of two of those situations, namely problems involving reinstatement and floating conclusions. It is discussed how the recent “principle of pragmatic modulation” could be a first step in order to overcome the mild credulity of Mental Model reasoning.
- Subjects
DEFAULT reasoning; INFERENCE (Logic); CREDULITY; SKEPTICISM
- Publication
Cognitive Science, 2004, Vol 28, Issue 4, p621
- ISSN
0364-0213
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1207/s15516709cog2804_6