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- Title
Seller competition by mechanism design.
- Authors
Damianov, Damian
- Abstract
This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and converges to zero in the limit. We study how the surplus of buyers and sellers depends on the number of agents on each side of the market in this decentralized trading environment.
- Subjects
GAME theory; AUCTIONS; ECONOMIC competition; ECONOMIC equilibrium; DISTRIBUTION (Economic theory); ECONOMIC convergence; DEALERS (Retail trade)
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2012, Vol 51, Issue 1, p105
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-010-0597-z