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- Title
Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities.
- Authors
Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix; Geist, Christian; Hofbauer, Johannes
- Abstract
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. A common flaw of some voting rules, known as the no-show paradox, is that agents may obtain a more preferred outcome by abstaining from an election. We study strategic abstention for set-valued voting rules based on Kelly's and Fishburn's preference extensions. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that, whenever there are at least five alternatives and seven agents, every Pareto-optimal majoritarian voting rule suffers from the no-show paradox with respect to Fishburn's extension. This is achieved by reducing the statement to a finite - yet very large - problem, which is encoded as a formula in propositional logic and then shown to be unsatisfiable by a SAT solver. We also provide a human-readable proof which we extracted from a minimal unsatisfiable core of the formula. Secondly, we prove that every voting rule that satisfies two natural conditions cannot be manipulated by strategic abstention with respect to Kelly's extension and give examples of well-known Pareto-optimal majoritarian voting rules that meet these requirements.
- Subjects
VOTING abstention; LEGAL judgments; VOTING; ELECTIONS; MAJORITARIANISM
- Publication
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2019, Vol 66, p1031
- ISSN
1076-9757
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1613/jair.1.11876