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- Title
Illusionism: an Argument for Its Incoherence.
- Authors
Lipuš, Alen; Bregant, Janez
- Abstract
In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers (J Conscious Stud 25(9–10):6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is not incoherent, even if it is implausible and empirically false. Our paper argues against this: strong illusionism is poorly established. The first part presents the reasoning leading to strong illusionism; i.e., it describes the initial conditions and relations among them for its establishment. The second part of the paper argues that strong illusionism is not constructed in a satisfactory way and calls the flaw in establishing it the pre-illusion problem. The third part demonstrates that the existing defense of strong illusionism does not save it from the pre-illusion problem, while the fourth part of the paper outlines two strategies to fight the pre-illusion problem, concluding, however, that they fail to do so, and indicates one possible way in which illusionism might be, nevertheless, coherently established.
- Subjects
ARGUMENT
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2022, Vol 37, Issue 3, p341
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-021-00483-z