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- Title
Time Series Variation in the Efficacy of Executive Risk-Taking Incentives: The Role of Market-Wide Uncertainty.
- Authors
Cadman, Brian D.; Campbell, John L.; Johnson, Ryan G.
- Abstract
Boards of directors encourage risk-averse managers to take risky actions by providing stock options and severance pay. We demonstrate that the ability of these incentives to encourage risk-taking hinges on the level of uncertainty facing the manager. We confirm prior findings that stock option convexity encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds when market-wide uncertainty is low. We also confirm prior findings that severance pay encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds during high market-wide uncertainty and negative market-wide performance. Finally, we find that compensation committees respond to variation in uncertainty by adjusting the level of option grants. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of incentives to take risk varies with the market-wide uncertainty, and that boards consider this in annual compensation design. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; K22; M40; M46.
- Subjects
CORPORATE governance; EXECUTIVE compensation; STOCK options; SEVERANCE pay; FINANCIAL risk
- Publication
Accounting Review, 2024, Vol 99, Issue 2, p113
- ISSN
0001-4826
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2308/TAR-2021-0149