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- Title
Standards for Modest Bayesian Credences.
- Authors
Cisewski, Jessi; Kadane, Joseph B.; Schervish, Mark J.; Seidenfeld, Teddy; Stern, Rafael
- Abstract
Gordon Belot argues that Bayesian theory is epistemologically immodest. In response, we show that the topological conditions that underpin his criticisms of asymptotic Bayesian conditioning are self-defeating. They require extreme a priori credences regarding, for example, the limiting behavior of observed relative frequencies. We offer a different explication of Bayesian modesty using a goal of consensus: rival scientific opinions should be responsive to new facts as a way to resolve their disputes. Also we address Adam Elga's rebuttal to Belot's analysis, which focuses attention on the role that the assumption of countable additivity plays in Belot's criticisms.
- Subjects
BAYESIAN analysis; CRITICISM; TOPOLOGY; THEORY of knowledge; STATISTICAL decision making
- Publication
Philosophy of Science, 2018, Vol 85, Issue 1, p53
- ISSN
0031-8248
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1086/694836