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- Title
Ontic terms and metaontology, or: on what there actually is.
- Authors
Parent, T.
- Abstract
Terms such as 'exist', 'actual', etc., (hereafter, 'ontic terms') are recognized as having uses that are not ontologically committing, in addition to the usual commissive uses. (Consider, e.g., the Platonic and the neutral readings of 'There is an even prime'.) In this paper, I identify five different noncommissive uses for ontic terms, and (by a kind of via negativa) attempt to define the commissive use, focusing on 'actual' as my example. The problem, however, is that the resulting definiens for the commissive 'actual' is itself equivocal between a commissive and a noncommissive reading. I thus consider other proposals for defining the commissive use, including two proposals from David Lewis. However, each proposal is found to be equivocal in the same way-and eventually I argue that it is impossible to define an ontic term unequivocally. Even so, this is not meant to overshadow that we can understand an ontic term as univocally commissive, in certain conversational contexts. I close by illustrating the import of these observations for the Hirsch-Sider debate in metaontology.
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY; PHILOSOPHY -- Terminology; DEBATE; LEWIS, David K. (David Kellogg), 1941-2001; METAPHYSICS
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2014, Vol 170, Issue 2, p199
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-013-0207-6