We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
MORALITY IN THE FIRST PERSON PLURAL.
- Authors
Postema, Gerald J.
- Abstract
This article explores Conrad Johnson's argument that moral reasoning is a form of practical reasoning in the first person plural. According to the author, it is tempting to equate this plural point of view with rules actually in place in a given community, understanding plural practical reasoning simply as reasoning from these rules. This removes all the mystery from the notion of a plural deliberative perspective, but the price for comprehensibility is high; however, it also deprives ordinary moral agents of resources to think critically about their rules. Yet they are likely to be forced to do so, for, as Johnson acknowledges, the rules need revising and even reform from time to time, and even in a relatively stable moral framework ordinary moral agents must deliberate about how best to understand and discharge their moral responsibilities. The author argues that Johnson needs an account of this plural deliberative perspective if his project is to succeed. The primary inspiration for Johnson's account of the plural point of view was David Hume. Johnson appeals to Hume's story of the origins of the norms of justice. According to Hume, justice is possible in a group only if a common sense of interest is available to its members.
- Subjects
PLURALISM; REASONING; ETHICS; PRACTICAL reason; JOHNSON, Conrad
- Publication
Law & Philosophy, 1995, Vol 14, Issue 1, p35
- ISSN
0167-5249
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF01000524