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- Title
Breaking the explanatory circle.
- Authors
Hicks, Michael Townsen
- Abstract
Humeans are often accused of positing laws which fail to explain or are involved in explanatory circularity. Here, I will argue that these arguments are confused, but not because of anything to do with Humeanism: rather, they rest on false assumptions about causal explanation. I'll show how these arguments can be neatly sidestepped if one takes on two plausible commitments which are motivated independently of Humeanism: first, that laws don't directly feature in scientific explanation (a view defended recently by Ruben in R Inst Philos Suppl 27:95–117, 1990, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100005063 and Skow in Reasons why, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) and second, the view that explanation is contrastive. After outlining and motivating these views, I show how they bear on explanation-based arguments against Humeanism.
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy); PHYSICAL laws; THEORY of knowledge; HUME, David, 1711-1776; METAPHYSICS
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2021, Vol 178, Issue 2, p533
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-020-01444-9