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- Title
December 1944: Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Calculated Risk in the Ardennes.
- Authors
RICKARD, JOHN NELSON
- Abstract
The purpose of this article is to investigate the claim made by both Eisenhower and Bradley that they had taken a calculated risk in weakly holding the Ardennes sector of the Allied line in December 1944. Specifically, the degree of "calculation" is subjected to critical analysis. The scope of the investigation covers the decision-making process of Eisenhower and Bradley prior to the German counteroffensive on 16 December. Their calculation of the risks involved is tested against the estimate of the situation, the key planning tool used by commanders to logically consider all aspects of a military problem. The objectives of the article are to assess how they conceptualized the risk in the Ardennes and to ascertain whether or not they actually had a plan for dealing with a large-scale German attack there. The results of the investigation prove that Eisenhower's chosen line of action, to leave the Ardennes weakly defended, did not promise success regardless of what the enemy did. Moreover, it proves that Bradley's estimate of the situation was faulty and that he did not have an army group-level plan to deal with the possibility of a major German effort against his weakly held front in the Ardennes.
- Subjects
LUXEMBOURG; BELGIUM; MEUSE River; EISENHOWER, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969; BATTLE of the Ardennes, 1944-1945; BRADLEY, Omar Nelson, 1893-1981; WORLD War II campaigns
- Publication
Global War Studies, 2011, Vol 8, Issue 1, p7
- ISSN
1949-8489
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.5893/19498489.08.01.01