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- Title
Informal Consequences of Budget Institutions in the US Congress.
- Authors
Clarke, Andrew J.; Lowande, Kenneth S.
- Abstract
Though considerable research focuses on formal institutions in Congress, scholars have long acknowledged that much of what guides legislative behavior is unwritten. To advance this area, we leverage a tool that allows appropriators to redirect billions of dollars from mandatory programs to discretionary projects. Changes in mandatory program spending-known as 'CHIMPs'-show that existing institutions are often maintained by the strategic action of legislators. In the case of CHIMPs, we find their use is largely a response to formal constraints and that they are preserved through avoidance of minimum reform coalitions. This highlights that the legislative process-and budgetary outcomes in particular-cannot be understood without attention to procedures which remain 'off the books.'
- Subjects
UNITED States. Congress; FINANCIAL institutions; BUDGET; COALITIONS; DOLLAR
- Publication
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2016, Vol 41, Issue 4, p965
- ISSN
0362-9805
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/lsq.12134