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- Title
Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation.
- Authors
Kirsch, Florian; Rühmkorf, Ronald
- Abstract
Official lenders provide financial assistance to countries that face sovereign debt crises. The availability of financial assistance has counteracting effects on the default incentives of governments. On the one hand, financial assistance can help to avoid defaults by bridging times of fundamental crises or resolving coordination failures among private investors. On the other hand, the insurance effect of financial assistance lowers borrowing costs, which induces the sovereign to accumulate higher debt levels. To assess the overall effect of financial assistance on the probability of default, we construct a quantitative model of endogenous credit structure and sovereign default that allows for self-fulfilling expectations of default. Calibrating the model to Argentinean data, we find that the availability of financial assistance reduces the number of defaults that occur due to self-fulfilling runs by private investors. However, at the same time, it raises average debt levels causing an overall increase in the probability of default.
- Subjects
REPUDIATION (Public finance); PUBLIC debts; FINANCIAL bailouts; DEBT relief; DEFAULT (Finance); DEBTOR &; creditor
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2017, Vol 64, Issue 4, p777
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-015-0945-0