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- Title
Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe.
- Authors
Bruce, Alistair; Buck, Trevor; Main, Brian G. M.
- Abstract
We argue that the dominance of principal-agent theory as an approach to investigating executive pay has led to an overly narrow focus which may be unhelpful when considering cross-country differences and probably also hinders within-country analysis. The paper discusses the interlinked nature of three available theoretical lenses, namely principal-agent, executive power, and stewardship/stakeholder theories. It argues that institutional theory can provide a useful overarching framework within which appropriate variants of these approaches can be deployed to better comprehend developments in executive pay. We illustrate our approach with a discussion of executive pay in the UK and in Germany.
- Subjects
EXECUTIVE compensation; EXECUTIVE ability (Management); CORPORATE governance; RESEARCH; PERFORMANCE standards; FINANCIAL performance; AGENCY theory; BUSINESS conditions; MANAGEMENT; ORGANIZATIONAL behavior research; BRITISH corporations; GERMAN corporations; CORPORATE culture
- Publication
Journal of Management Studies (Wiley-Blackwell), 2005, Vol 42, Issue 7, p1493
- ISSN
0022-2380
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00553.x