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- Title
Input price discrimination by resale market.
- Authors
Miklós‐Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg
- Abstract
This article analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market with the higher aggregate cross‐seller diversion ratio. We find that discrimination can improve allocative efficiency and present sufficient conditions, involving the pass‐through rates and the market demand curvatures in the different markets, under which discrimination has positive effects on output and welfare. Our insights are relevant for the policy treatment of vertical restraints on online sales.
- Subjects
PRICE discrimination; RESALE; INTERNET sales
- Publication
RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell), 2021, Vol 52, Issue 4, p727
- ISSN
0741-6261
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12389