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- Title
Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism.
- Authors
Brenner, Andrew
- Abstract
In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence.
- Subjects
WHOLE &; parts (Philosophy); NIHILISM (Philosophy); PHILOSOPHERS; PERCEPTION (Philosophy); SENSORY perception
- Publication
Philosophical Quarterly, 2024, Vol 74, Issue 1, p68
- ISSN
0031-8094
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/pq/pqac081